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Finding the Essential: 
A Phenomenological Look at Hal Hartley's No Such Thing 
 
Introduction 
Humanity appears to have an inherent desire to project our collective 
unconscious into and onto unexplainable phenomena.  In doing so, we are 
forever distancing and delaying what we wish not to confront.  Hal Hartley's No 
Such Thing entertains this desire for projection and presents a less transcendent 
and more embodied form of these phenomena. He offers the viewer a cinematic 
meditation suggesting that in a materialist age our belief in the supernatural 
fades in importance; and thus, our collective unconscious has less of a need for 
archetypes of otherworldly proportions.  This need for projection, however, does 
not evaporate.  Rather, our unconscious desires and fears become transferred to 
more identifiable and recognizable phenomena and personae.   The analogy to a 
shift in belief from a wizardly God of the Old Testament and the earthly Christ of 
the New Testament is illustrative of this transference.  It is not as though the 
murkiness of our unconscious has changed; rather, the entities on which we cast 
our faith and fears take on a form more coherent with our socio-historical 
condition.  In the case of Hartley’s most recent film, it is a society numbed by 
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information overload with which these archetypes must cohere, a world where 
nothing is shocking.  Hartley's take on society may be grim (although fairly 
accurate) but he does provide us with a savior: a savior of existential, as well as 
transcendental significance. 
 
It will help to deepen our understanding of No Such Thing if we revisit Paul 
Schrader's1  central thesis in Transcendental Style in Film. This essay will do so, 
and then propose a reconfiguration of transcendence in film, applying 
phenomenological categories to Hartley's thought-provoking cinematic essay.   
This is not an exercise devised to deconstruct or debunk Schrader's thesis.  
Rather, what follows should be regarded as an expansion and extrapolation of 
his account of the transcendent, and how this is figured in cinematic forms.  The 
need for such an expansion is clear: if we remain tied to Schrader's definitions of 
the Transcendental, there are key aspects of the film (such as the agency of its 
characters, its narrative progression, its assertion of the alogical, and the 
subjectivity of the archetype offered therein) that come close to, but nonetheless 
fall short of, his strictly "Holy" definition of the transcendent.  I will begin with 
an overview of Schrader's main points, followed by a reconfiguration of these, to 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of adopting an analysis of Hartley's film drawn 
from existential phenomenology. 
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I have chosen a work by Hal Hartley for distinct reasons. Hartley has created an 
oeuvre that, on various levels, attempts to get at the essence of ideas, characters, 
and social structures.  His work is not profoundly religious, but his films 
repeatedly place characters within a web of philosophical and theological 
questions, without over-intellectualizing.  He seems to imply that puzzlement 
over existence and society are questions we all wrestle with, but Hartley’s 
characters just do so more openly than most.  Other directors might also be seen 
as engaging in this kind of re-analysis of the transcendental in cinema (David 
Lynch, Peter Weir, Andrei Tarkovsky, and Lars Von Trier immediately spring to 
mind).  However, in order to restrict my discussion to only one film, I’ve chosen 
Hartley and his most recent production.  Hartley’s work lends itself for 
phenomenological analysis for several reasons, but most prominently because his 
characters are continually searching for self-meaning, questioning the bounds 
(and rules) of relationships, and (in this film in particular) exploring the nature of 
existence, faith, exploitation, and the miraculous.  In addition, characters within 
his films are rarely allowed to emote, fixing the film itself as an expression-
perception of the human condition, an aspect of phenomenology of extreme 
importance to the film experience2.  Finally, Hartley’s cinematic “minimalism” is 
instrumental to his continual search for the essence of his characters and the 
situations they find themselves in.  This minimalism, this drive for the essential, 
is exemplified by a rarified use of camera work, editing, sound, music, and 
dialogue, that is both cinematically and philosophically poetic. 
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Schrader on Transcendental Style in Cinema 
Paul Schrader's captivating analysis of the films of Ozu, Bresson, and Dreyer 
revolves around a central concept: the Transcendent.  Semantically, Schrader 
defines this term as simply "a general representative filmic form which expresses 
the Transcendent."3  Such films embody, according to Schrader, an expression of 
"the Holy".4  His critical method supposes two things: First, the existence of 
hierophanies, expressions of the transcendent in the world5 (here he makes an 
association to Eliade's6 7 work on comparative religions); and second, that even 
divergent cultures share common representative artistic forms8 (on this latter 
point his association is aligned with the artistic analysis carried out by 
Wolfflin9 , 10).  These two critical points are carried forward to discuss how some 
cinematic forms likewise can express the transcendent (or Holy), and that these 
representations suggest a kind of universal homogeneity.  Indeed, Schrader 
regards this style as having universal qualities, although he does account for 
personal and cultural influences as to how this is represented according to 
different directors.  However, he argues that "their similarities are stylistic, and 
represent a unified reflection of the Transcendent on film."11 
 
Schrader breaks down expressions of the transcendent according to three 
different thematic forms: 
1. The existence or presence of a Holy or Divine  
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2. Acts expressing something emanating from The Transcendent (i.e. 
miracles, divine communion, etc.) 
3. The experience of transcendence (a character's spiritual path 
leading toward some form of enlightenment or sanctification). 
 
All of the above may manifest in literal filmic forms, in terms of characters and 
narrative progression.  But, Schrader is quick to note that stylistic elements such 
as mise-en-scene, cinematography, and editing can all contribute to the overall 
"look" and "feel" of the transcendental style in film. 
 
There are two other points raised by Schrader that are deserving of preliminary 
discussion and analysis.  These pertain to human experiences of phenomena and 
(in our first analogy to Husserlian phenomenology) how we must learn to strip 
away epistemologies, scientific theories, and ontologies, if we are to get at "the 
things themselves".  Conventional interpretations of the transcendental style in 
cinema can often frustrate viewers if they are unable to put their natural attitude 
"out of play".  As Schrader observes, "Transcendental style seeks to maximize the 
mystery of existence; it eschews all conventional interpretations of reality: 
realism, naturalism, psychologism, romanticism, expressionism, impressionism, 
and, finally, rationalism."12  Applying this to the Monster in No Such Thing, 
transcendental style would maintain his existence as a "mystery". 
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However, if we move from Schrader's theories and compare a similar statement 
from Ihde's13 discussion on interpretation and description in his 1986 treatise 
Experimental Phenomenology, we may come closer to understanding this 
character's significance within the film.  As Ihde has stated, "Hermeneutic rules 
establish a strictly descriptive interpretation of experience, which eschews 
explanation and all hypothetical constructions relying upon, presupposing or 
seeking to establish accounts of experience that go behind or above 
experience.”14  Therefore, explanation of the "mysterious" or "unexplainable" (the 
three miracles, the Monster himself) within Hartley's film, requires, first and 
foremost, an accounting for what is experienced based on an interpretation free 
of preconceived notions.  During the press conference, for example, the Monster 
is subjected to a string of questions that presume a mythological nature to his 
persona, when in fact, his "monstrousness" is of a very different kind than that of 
fairy tales.  The reporters and scientists fail to observe these differences, precisely 
because of their unwillingness (or inability) to bracket their projected 
expectations. 
 
In the case of Hartley's film, it is not embodying "the mystery of existence" (as 
Schrader might see it) that propels the characters and story, but rather a 
profound meditation on the nature of existence.  The randomness of events (such 
as an unprovoked punch in the stomach or a plane crashing into the sea, or for 
that matter, there being only one survivor) may in fact eschew conventional 
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interpretations of reality, but these events exist as phenomena in and among 
themselves.  They are neither provided an explanation, nor do they seem to  
demand one.  Rather, their significance is in what they are (i.e. that they exist, not 
why they occurred).  And in this Hartley (perhaps unwittingly) offers such events 
to the spectator as phenomena reduced to their essence.  We as spectators are 
invited (if we are so inclined) to determine the reasons or "logic" behind such 
events.  But we must be cautious not to invest such interpretations with our 
biases.  This is particularly important considering what is characteristic of 
Hartley's manner of filmmaking, because such events frequently do not stand out 
so much as punctuations, but flow as part of the narrative progression.  Hartley 
is committed to cutting past the superfluous in film, which is his way of 
operating outside the assumption that there is often "a certain way  [i.e. "natural 
attitude"] things are done"15 in cinema.  By not making such events out to be 
spectacular, the spectator is expected to take these as "natural": People do get 
punched, airplanes do crash.  While open to interpretation, we must be reminded 
that it is the experience of such phenomena that remains primary, especially so 
with films addressing themes of transcendence. 
 
Taken from another vantage point, Schrader upholds that films which express 
transcendental style do so by eliminating "elements which are primarily 
expressive of human experience."16  He goes on to conclude that "Transcendental 
style…transforms experience into a repeatable ritual which can be repeatedly 
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transcended."17  There are two issues to deal with here; first, human experience is 
integral to the encounter with phenomena.  But the expression of this experience, 
in many cinematic occasions, can be equated to what Husserl18 calls our "natural 
attitude" towards phenomena, if indeed we go no further than a first-hand 
interpretation.  In the case of transcendental cinema, expression of what is 
individual in human experience is eliminated so as to point towards the 
transcendental qualities of the phenomenological encounter.  Therefore, 
experience is signified as repeatable, pre-intellectual, pre-cultural, pre-reflective.  
Hartley's films likewise narrow the boundaries of human expression in order for 
the experience itself to remain significant.  Hartley has commented upon his 
manner of directing actors, which does not allow them to provide any emotional 
pitch to their dialogue, avoiding such punctuations and theatrical indulgences; in 
his words, he prefers to let the film as a whole "have a personality".19  In short, 
Hartley finds individual expression sloppy because it can too easily obscure the 
essence of phenomena, and thus, detract from the overall thrust and spirit of the 
film.  
 
Before I provide a synopsis of Hartley’s film, let me first outline my 
reconfiguration of Schrader's analysis of the transcendental in film. I deviate 
slightly from Schrader's term “Transcendental style”, and opt for the term 
"transcendence"; noting that this does not suggest a particular style of 
filmmaking, but is rather a global characteristic of certain films, and thus 
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becomes a heuristic means for critiquing and deconstructing character and 
narrative elements.  
 
Re-configuring Schrader's Transcendental Style 
The forms of transcendence that I will use to expand Schrader's terms are a slight 
variation on his original thesis: these include 
1. The Transcendent (or Holy): refigured as the Subjective Archetype  
2. Spiritual Transcendence: refigured as Anarcho-Catholicism  
3. Transcendental Acts: refigured as Agency of the Saint 
 
Items 1,2, and 3 will be compared to Schrader's original three definitions, and 
(using Hartley's film) I will show how the proposed reconfiguration of these 
forms of transcendence provide a more insightful and appropriate analysis of 
transcendence in film. 
 
Schrader's previous point regarding the irrational and abstract provides a good 
lead-in to a discussion of Hartley's film.  No Such Thing is ripe with what could 
commonly be regarded as obscure and illogical plot elements.  But, I will argue 
that a reading of the film from this position would be missing something of great 
significance to how the film is constructed thematically.  Abstract and illogical do 
not do justice to certain plot elements within Hartley's film, but rather these 
elements should be seen as alogical (namely, that illogical would suggest a 
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certain degree of sloppiness or authorial indulgence, while alogical implies that 
the director and film are not even attempting to subscribe to a system of logic, 
and therefore the rationale and reasoning falls outside of common notions of 
what "makes sense" or is "logical").  Hartley's manner of filmmaking is often 
regarded as "minimalist".  This comes closer to the point, but still does not 
account for the rationale for the choice of style here.  I prefer to see his 
"minimalism" as a means of getting past the superfluous, a means which Hartley 
himself has identified20 as getting at the "essence" of things.  And this is akin to 
the epoché, or bracketing reductions, which are characteristic of 
phenomenological analysis. 
 
 
Synopsis of No Such Thing 
No Such Thing is a story that involves a monster, a young woman, and the mass 
media.  It entertains themes of forgiveness, compassion, trust, faith and 
sanctification, while providing a biting commentary on society run amok, 
ineffectual and totalitarian governmental control, the often inhumane nature of 
scientific inquiry, and the mass media's relentless appetite for sensationalism. In 
the course of the story a young girl named Beatrice experiences three "miracles", 
and thus takes on a "saint-like" persona.  The Monster, whose only wish is to die, 
is exploited by the media and quickly transformed into a valuable commodity.  
Eagerly scavenging for headlines, aggressively constructing a glitzy exposé 
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revolving around the Monster and Beatrice; recasting the unassuming young 
lady as a sexy ingenue, and subjecting the Monster to a media onslaught, 
Beatrice's employers (represented by a chain smoking Helen Mirren) finally 
pawn him off to scientific experimentations. In fact, it could be suggested that the 
"real" monster in the film does not appear to be the beast who breathes fire, but 
rather the media types who conspire against him. 
 
The Monster is indestructible and ageless (although at the outset of the film he 
admits he's "not the monster [he] used to be").  His physique and demeanor are 
gargantuan though nearly human, except for the horns above his brow and his 
reptilian complexion.  At the beginning of the film we find him in mid-
monologue, hiding out in Northern Iceland, reclusive and in utter misery.  He 
sends out a call for help using an audio recorder, booty from a news crew that 
previously had came to interview him (and who were subsequently "torn to 
pieces").  In this message he presents an ultimatum to humanity: He wants to die, 
to be killed (and thus, in his eyes, "saved"), and if humans are unwilling to help, 
him, then he'll be forced to go on a rampage and kill every last one of us   
(seemingly, humanity is the source of his misery).  The message is received by 
Beatrice, who works for a large New York City news agency, under the direction 
of a brooding despot.  Despite her lowly position within the news department 
(e.g. answering phones, making coffee, etc.), Beatrice requests to be the one sent 
to Iceland to investigate, but her real motivation lies neither in substantiating the 
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"monster story" nor in attempting to help the monster.  Rather, she wants to 
discover what has happened to her fiancé, who was a member of the missing 
news crew (and, unbeknownst to her, had been slaughtered).   
 
Before Beatrice even boards the plane to Iceland, she encounters domestic 
terrorism, arms smuggling, a demolition crew, and a contorted junky 
experiencing violent withdrawal who assaults and mugs her.  She barely makes 
her flight to Iceland.  However, Beatrice's journey (which is classically obtuse) is 
an even more perilous one.  Her trip is circuitously rerouted via Brussels and 
Lisbon – and before reaching Brussels her plane crashes into the sea.  Everyone 
on board perishing, leaving her as the sole survivor.  This marks the first 
"miracle" that Beatrice undergoes.  
 
Beatrice may have survived the plane crash, but she is badly injured and even 
temporarily paralyzed from the neck down.  After politely refusing to give her 
boss an exclusive story on the “drama” of the plane crash, Beatrice decides to test 
her luck further by subjecting herself to a highly experimental form of intensive 
surgery, while under the care of a sympathetic doctor at a Reykjavik hospital.  
The surgery is done in order to restore her ability to walk, but it involves little or 
no anesthetic (hence its experimental and rather dangerous nature).  The agony 
of the surgery is represented through Hartley's traditional mastery of cinematic 
minimalism (her scream is muted, quickly followed by a flash of white light), 
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making her suffering and tremendous pain all the more moving to the audience.  
Beatrice survives this operation (a second miracle), and within six months 
continues on her journey towards the monster; at first by car and cane, and then 
by horseback and foot, across the stark landscape of Iceland.  In a telling moment 
(that further suggests the saintly nature of Beatrice) as she leaves the hospital, the 
young children of Reykjavik surround her in amazement, gently vying to touch 
her blonde hair, in an effort to make physical contact with the embodiment of a 
miracle.  Beatrice's recovery from the operation is nothing short of miraculous; it 
restores her unscathed and able to walk amongst the living. 
 
The third miracle Beatrice undergoes is surviving her confrontation with the 
Monster. The Monster's reputation and appetite for killing has already been 
established, so when Beatrice first encounters him, it is not so much a "maiden 
within the monster's lair" type of situation (which might be expected from other 
directors).   Instead, their first encounter is redolent with Hartley's rapid-fire and 
staccato dialogue; Beatrice and the Monster each probe one another verbally as to 
who they are, what are they doing here, and where they hope to go, etc.  Soon 
the Monster states that even he is impressed that she's still alive (meaning he 
hasn't killed her, for the audience, this line has double meaning, for we have 
already witnessed two other events which she should not have survived). 
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Gradually, though tenuously, an element of trust emerges between the Monster 
and Beatrice.  He needs her to help him find an eccentric scientist (Dr. Artaud, 
apparently the only one who can put the monster out of his misery), but her 
motivation lies less in something she needs from him (she is already famous 
from the encounter), but more an expression of compassion. He asked for her 
help, so being the sensitive and empathetic person she is, she eventually decides 
to help him, but only after he adheres to her request that he promise not to kill 
anyone throughout their journey.  Though his response is characteristic ("You 
can't expect me to go out there [into the world] and not kill anyone!"21), he sticks 
to his promise throughout. 
 
The two embark for New York City, and having already contacted the media 
matriarch, they arrange for a secured arrival in Manhattan.  The manner of their 
arrival foreshadows his celebrity status, complete with crowds, groupies, flash 
cameras, and news reporters.  Once in Manhattan, the Monster and Beatrice are 
immediately exploited as the latest celebrity couple, and the Monster is 
predictably treated as no more than a curious peculiarity, a hip freak of nature.  
Their search for Dr. Artaud is delayed in favor of a press conference, and during 
his interview the Monster has some thought-provoking things to say about 
himself, and more importantly, about humanity. 
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"What made you morons so damned adaptable?"  The Monster calmly reflects 
upon his previous inquiries into such matters, which in the past has compelled 
him to literally "tear us apart", but upon cracking a human subject open, the 
monster found nothing of significance; much to his disappointment, he 
discovered only a crude display of "blood, guts, and shit, same as everything 
else.  Pointless, absurd.  Just another fucking accident."  This assessment of our 
human condition points to one thing; that physiologically and anatomically our 
species is no different from the other life-forms that share our eco-systems.  What 
makes us "so damned adaptable" may be our cognitive ability to conceptualize 
and project ideas, thoughts, fears and desires, for doing so allows us to distance 
and delay the need for confronting what troubles us.  Of course, this cognitive 
means of projection has its more immediate advantages for survival, such as the 
capability of our hominid ancestors to "plan ahead" for securing their next meal.  
But Hartley is more concerned with the projection of our unconscious and the 
(literal) forms this may take.  He puts a curious spin on this idea which is 
reminiscent of certain theories associated with quantum physics22; namely, that 
the mere act of thinking of something gives it an existence.  Hartley carries this 
further to suggest that ideas, fears, concepts, etc. can take on material form, and 
therefore exercise affectivity in the "real" world; hence, the undeniable 
materialization and a highly animated Monster. 
"Let's get right down to the main issue here:  
A monster, in this day and age?   
I mean, don't you just find that – you know, like irrelevant?" 
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    News Reporter 
 
The reporter's rather frank and direct question is seen as a challenge to the 
Monster's very existence; the snide "what are you doing here?" kind of question 
that might be asked of an uninvited guest at an upscale cocktail party.  The 
question signals modern society's waning need for the supernatural, particularly 
striking in a Western culture obsessed with materialism.  The age of monsters 
and gods has given way to more practical, observable phenomena.  But it's not 
that we no longer believe in monsters, but that they have lost significance within 
our materialist world: As the news producer asks rather dryly, upon her first 
meeting with the Monster; "So, you're the monster, I guess."  As if to be saying 
"you're the monster…so what?".  Thus, his existence is less monstrous and more 
anomalous, if not trivial.  In light of our discontinued belief in the supernatural, 
however, the death of monsters is not so easily accomplished.  This one’s angry, 
and he's not just going to go away.   
 
Immediately following his encounter with the press, instead of being taken to the 
kindly Dr. Artaud, the Monster is escorted to the lab of an insensitive, almost 
robot-like scientist, where he is subsequently tortured; all in the name of 
objective scientific enquiry.  Thereafter the Monster, helpless – for he honors his 
promise not to kill anyone – is released into the world where he is subjected to 
various random assaults and humiliations at the hands of a cruel and taunting 
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public.  Eventually, through the help of Beatrice and a few sympathetic 
accomplices, he returns to Iceland to be destroyed. 
 
But his destruction (realizing for himself, that he is only a materialization of 
humanity's fears) may suggest only that his time has past; the age of monsters 
and superstition giving way to a more recognizable form and manifestation of 
belief.  This is where the scenario becomes a little cloudy.  Hartley himself has 
stated23 that the monster "symbolizes nothing".  But it is tempting to see these 
two characters as having significant biblical implications.  On the one hand, we 
can regard the Monster as standing in for the God of the Old Testament 
(exhibiting the arcane attributes of a destroyer, a grand manipulator and 
indestructible entity wielding supernatural powers), while Beatrice may 
represent a more earthly form of divinity, much like the Savior of the New 
Testament (corporeal, yet exhibiting the divine qualities of innocence, 
compassion, forgiveness, faith, and the grace to survive various trials/miracles).  
If the monster has become disenchanted with humanity, Beatrice embraces the 
potential good in all beings (human or otherwise), thus exhibiting an extreme 
measure of faith in humanity, despite the corruption, exploitation, and violence 
characteristic of early 21st century society.   
 
"Matter is one, yes of course.  That's easy.   
But you see, at different densities.   
Heavy and light.  It can interpenetrate." 
    Dr. Artaud 
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In the last sequence of the film, the Monster is "destroyed" through the aid of Dr. 
Artaud and his quizzical  "matter eradicator".  According to the eccentric doctor's 
theories, all things have matter – even concepts, beliefs, etc. – however, these 
exist at different densities.  It is presumed that the Monster's existence is 
therefore a materialization of our beliefs (or more appropriately, our fears).  He is 
a concept made material.  But it appears that a waning of belief in his existence is 
not enough to terminate him.  And this is where a pinch of phenomenology can 
aid in analysis.  To the Monster, his existence is solipsistic, and therefore, his 
termination requires the recognition of his own subjectivity.  Following Husserl, 
the idea of self is only possible in reference to an other.  If the Monster is to cease 
to exist, then he must be made aware that his existence itself is no more than a 
projection.  At this point in history, Hartley seems to suggest humanity no longer 
needs to believe in monsters and myths, that we live in an age obsessed only 
with materiality, the observable, and the immediate. 
 
Through the recognition of his own subjectivity as merely a projection, the 
Monster attains his goal of non-existence.  Yet, due to some remarkably quick 
and stylish editing and lighting, Hartley hints at a transference from the Monster 
to Beatrice; and in doing so suggests that she may embody humanity's salvation.  
The age of monsters is behind us, as is the age of faith and belief in what we 
cannot see.  And within the age of materialism, if there is to be any salvation, it is 
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through miracles we can actually witness (such as the trials/portents associated 
with Beatrice).  Perhaps the materialist age requires a material beacon, not a 
conceptual one?  The final sequence of the film rapidly cuts between the Monster 
and Beatrice, suggesting that his existence does not simply fade, but converges 
with Beatrice; she absorbs all that has been projected upon him.  As the 
projection of our fears ceases to take on the image of monsters, such projections 
(along with our hopes and desires) are put upon the existential and benevolent 
Beatrice.  In so doing, she assumes a similar, though more corporeally-rooted, 
transcendental, archetypal essence.  Hartley's final image in the film draws from 
Christian iconography to underscore this point: Beatrice in close up, blonde hair 
flowing, eyes crystalline, a devastatingly beautiful and tranquil face bathed in 
white light – numinous. 
 
The Transcendental Refigured as The Subjective Archetype 
Hartley himself has described the monster as a being who is simply in search of 
his own purpose.24  He does not know why he exists, just that he does.  Further, 
his only desire is to be put to rest. These two things hold great significance to 
understanding his character: that while he may sport weathered horns above his 
brow, he is less the terrible, thoughtless violent monster that his reputation 
speaks of, but more the contemplative, psychologically tormented being who just 
wants to know why he's here.  In the end, he simply wants to be destroyed; 
which posits him as closer to a mortal than a supernatural phenomenon. 
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Contrary to Schrader's definition, Hartley's film suggests that "The 
Transcendental" does not reside in some heavenly or divine locale outside of the 
main characters, but exists within them.  Therefore, it is necessary to refigure 
Schrader's definition, and situate (or look for) the transcendental as a quality that 
exists within the two main characters of the Monster and Beatrice.  To see it 
properly in this light, neither the Monster nor Beatrice represent the 
Transcendental in any classical sense, but rather are existential beings who 
exhibit transcendental qualities (subjective and existential archetypes).  I have 
suggested above that Hartley has adorned both of these characters with these 
qualities, and, in this connection, character and plot elements that Schrader 
might posit as "Holy" can be better understood if subjected to phenomenological 
description. 
 
"I want to die but I can't.  I'm indestructible.  I'm sorry, it's not my fault;  
must be yours.   
I know of no god who could be that cruel.   
I know of no God…unless, of course, I am God.   
But then what difference would that make?  I'd still be fucked." 
     The Monster 
 
The Monster is apparently indestructible and ageless (well, almost – as we can 
presume his termination during the final sequence of the film).  Yet, he is no 
more than a projection.  He has become what we have intended him to be as an 
animation, an archetype generated by our unconscious.  Without going beyond a 
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transcendental explanation for his existence – as Ihde25 has critiqued of 
transcendental phenomenology – for the scientist and the news producer within 
the film, the Monster confirms them in their narrowly rationalistic metaphysics.  
That is, the Monster is encountered as verifying their preconceptions of who he 
is.  If indeed he is no more than a projection of humanity's fears, this makes him 
akin to the monsters and deities we have created out of a need to provide 
explanations for the unknown.  He is an anthro-projection, God-like, but his 
existence remains contingent upon our beliefs, and therefore his "divinity" is 
subjective, and not omnipresent and eternal.   
I remember when you were young.  Pond scum.   
Just another ooze at the edge of the local warm water.   
I was there.  I saw you evolve.” 
    The Monster 
 
Following Ihde's discussion of Husserlian phenomenology26, the transcendental 
is an "I" which presumably lies above and outside the correlation between noesis 
and noema (the experience and that which is experienced), rather than being 
constituted reflexively within the correlation.  The Monster assumes a 
transcendental state – an “ideal observer” as Ihde27 might refer to him –  because 
he is projected as such.  But as a projection he is part of this equation.  Therefore, 
re-inserting him into the correlation between noema and noesis amounts to no 
less than his self-reflection.  His self-reflection being a projection – of an idea 
made physical – the realization of this conditional existence results in his 
extinction.  By means of the "matter eradicator" the Monster is subjected to what 
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Ihde has called "the mirror of the world".  In this position, the Monster is forced 
to take on a reflexive turn: to see himself within the correlation between noema 
and noesis and not outside of this.  
 
We encounter the Monster and are provided no explanation for his existence: he 
just does.  His supernatural qualities are not explained.  During the Monster's 
subjugation to experimentation, the lab scientist states that since science can’t 
explain his existence, then he simply does not exist.  Yet, there he is, howling, 
strapped to an operating table, his body wired up to an elaborate display of 
technology.  Hartley seems to be alluding to the "blindness” of science; that in its 
experimentations to determine the nature of things, it misses what is right in 
front of its eyes: A sentient, living, (fire)breathing being.  If we follow Husserl's 
phenomenological reductions, then we must delay our desire for scientific 
theories in order to observe the phenomenon for how it appears to us.  Only 
Beatrice and Dr. Artaud are able to encounter and account for the Monster for 
what he is; a sorrowful and irritable creature in pain.  The two scientists in the 
film (Dr. Artaud and the lab scientist) exist as an interesting contrast on how the 
Monster is encountered.  As I stated above, the laboratory scientist refuses to 
"see" the Monster.  He is too deeply immersed in his technology.  As a 
counterpoint, Dr. Artaud (who incidentally has impaired optical vision, signified 
by his spectacles with lenses of tremendous girth) is able to encounter the 
Monster as a sentient being.  It can be said that the Monster is both saved by and 
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tortured by science.  But it is not science itself that imposes these ends upon him; 
rather it is the individual characters who practice such endeavors.  Hartley, in his 
sympathetic depiction of the "mad" Dr. Artaud, seems to indicate that if science 
is to be made humane, it must be willing to think unscientifically from time to 
time.  To do so, one must encounter phenomena with methods that respond to 
the phenomena themselves. 
 
Spiritual Transcendence: refigured as Anarcho-Catholicism 
In terms of narrative structure and cinematic stylization, Schrader draws from 
Maritain's28 , 29 concepts of "sparse" and "abundant" means in art and applies 
these to the transcendental style.  As Schrader uses these terms, abundant means 
are those associated with practicality, physical needs and goods, and sensual 
feelings.  Sparse means, conversely, are those cinematic elements concerned with 
the domain and cultivation of the spirit.  He notes, however, that sparse means 
are not ordered toward tangible success, but toward elevation of the spirit.  
Therefore, we can regard these as plot elements that either contain a corporeal or a 
spiritual significance.  And, further, Schrader states that the gradual shift from 
abundant to sparse means should be a clear sign of spiritual progression: “One 
way to determine the ‘spiritual quality’ of a cinematic style, therefore, is to 
examine the manner in which it disposes of its inherent abundant means and 
substitutes sparse means."30  However, Hartley provides the inverse of this 
spiritual equation, what I call Anarcho-Catholicism. 
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Hartley's playful reinterpretation and recasting of the "saintly path", through the 
character of Beatrice, provides a reversal in the progression from abundant to 
sparse means.  In doing so Beatrice presents a similarly sparse, though slightly 
different representation of the Transcendent as the Monster.  She appears mortal; 
she sleeps, drinks, smokes, copulates, etc., but all the same, retains Christ-like 
qualities.  She enters into and emerges from three miraculous situations.  
However, it would be simplistic and misguided to regard these miracles as signs 
of divine intervention.  Rather, they are illustrative of Beatrice's ability to 
encounter phenomena existentially; i.e., in a pre-judgmental, pre-reflective 
fashion. The three miracles are linked, not random; one is the result of the 
previous, etc.  Further, they are experiences necessary for Beatrice – trials meant 
to illustrate an unfolding of something inherent within her.  It would appear, 
therefore, that subjecting the progression of Beatrice's character to Schrader’s 
means of analysis would consider such corporeal acts as signifying her gradual 
corruption.  Rather, what Hartley shows is not the perversion of Beatrice, but the 
inversion of Schrader’s sparse and abundant means as a route toward 
sanctification.   
 
Beatrice first appears dressed in a rather plain manner; her pony-tailed hair and 
frumpy, gray dress deny her womanly figure.  As the story unfolds, her clothing 
progressively accentuates her attractive form and her behavior becomes more 
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"enworlded" (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking and getting inebriated, firing a 
pistol, having sex).  It is undeniable that her character progression is an inversion 
of Schrader's predicted path toward sainthood: Beatrice moves from sparse to 
abundant means.  In doing so, Beatrice undergoes and enters into trying 
experiences that are necessary for her to assume a transcendental state: one 
exhibiting both transcendent and existential characteristics.  Beatrice ultimately 
exists as a divine being of human proportions; a living, breathing individual that 
has undergone miraculous trials, and emerged unscathed, retaining the 
benevolent qualities of faith and virtue.  What might be regarded as corruptive 
activities are, on the contrary, experiences that fortify her corporeal and spiritual 
essence.  And, in this way, Hartley's depiction of her character progression is 
what I identify as a form of anarcho-catholicism; suggesting that the saintly route 
need not be shrouded in asceticism; on the contrary, through encountering the 
world in an existential manner, the virtues of Beatrice's character become all the 
more remarkable and deserving of praise. 
 
Transcendental Acts: refigured as Agency of the Saint 
Hartley provides another inversion of the Transcendental style in film, in that he 
denies the possibility of divine intervention on the world of his characters (an 
apparent disavowal of the concept of hierophanies).  Rather, Beatrice, along her 
saintly route, encounters adverse conditions and successfully emerges due to her 
ability to put her "natural attitude" out of play in the various trying situations she 
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encounters.  Her character has been described31 as not naïve, but wisely 
innocent, indicating that her experience of phenomena and characters is one that 
is advantageously pre-intellectual, pre-reflective, without judgement or fear.  
Therefore, it can be argued, that her character is not necessarily "blessed" (as it is 
even suggested at one point in the film).  Her perseverance is not the result of 
protection from above, but from her own non-judgmental and pre-reflective 
attitude and behavior.  Surviving the plane crash may take this to an extreme, 
but her survival of the operation and her confrontation with the Monster 
demonstrate that her endurance emanates from the existential quality of openly 
encountering phenomena for what they are. 
 
Beatrice can also be seen as performing a series of "reductions" reminiscent (and 
illustrative) of Husserl's phenomenology, in exhibiting an attitude free of socio-
cultural prejudices.  She is subjected to several warnings about the Monster's 
diabolical ferociousness, but nonetheless sustains her resolve, thus refusing to be 
spooked by all of the fear, paranoia, and even skeletal evidence and fire-
breathing threats made apparent to her.  In their initial confrontation she 
encounters him not as monster, but simply as other.  And by not projecting 
psychological or societal fears upon him, he (these) cannot harm her.   
 
So, in the end, Beatrice does not seem to behave according to some divine code or 
logic, rather it is her ability to encounter people and the world alogically; 
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innocent but with wisdom.  It is difficult to regard her as a person traversing a 
spiritual path, at least according to Schrader's definitions.  Though it appears that 
she assumes a saintly persona at the end of the film, in essence, she has changed 
little.  She is always already open, trusting, compassionate, etc.  It is perhaps the 
world (we can only hope) that will encounter her differently; see her as more 
than a servant girl (to the news producer), more than a princess and "ingenue" 
(as a media icon), and in the end as a sort of savior (as I've suggested earlier, the 
parallel shift between the Monster and Beatrice to the God of the Old Testament 
and the Savior of the New). 
 
Final Thoughts 
Throughout the film, both Beatrice and the spectator are confronted with 
seemingly inexplicable phenomena.  But Beatrice refuses the temptation (or gut 
reaction) to simply "explain" the Monster away; rather, she manages to encounter 
him pre-reflectively.  Similarly no explanation is offered to the spectator for the 
Monster's existence; he is taken "as is", that is, as a brute fact.  He breathes fire, 
period.  Beatrice survives three miraculous brushes with death, period.  
Explanation would cloud these plot elements.  Thus, the film spectator must 
encounter the same anomalies as Beatrice does – alogically (outside of logical 
constructs) – in order to move forward.  And this is typical of Hartley's style as a 
filmmaker and screenwriter.  He only puts in what is necessary to get to the 
essence of his characters and scenarios.  It may be minimalism, but I would 
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suggest that this brings us back to one of the functional attributes of Schrader's 
thesis, particularly his discussion of "sparse" means in cinema, and how these 
lend a certain transcendental quality to cinematic meditations on the nature and 
bounds of existence. 
 
The interplay between sparse and abundant means in film, and particularly 
within transcendental film, can be used to reinforce expressions of the 
transcendental.  Schrader regards the sparse as indicative of both character 
development along a spiritual path, and to cinematic construction.  I have taken 
issue with Schrader's application of this theory on character development, and 
hope that I have demonstrated that, in this regard, it does not always hold true.  
However, concerning cinematic construction, the sparse means of minimalism do 
allow for the essence of the story and its characters to emerge.  While abundant 
means are used to sustain audience interest (suspension of disbelief) this is done 
while rejecting the empathetic rationale for that interest, in order to set up a new 
priority.  Schrader32 suggests that indeed film is particularly well-suited for 
pointing to the transcendental, since film is the most realistic of artistic media, 
and therefore a departure from this (i.e. Hartley’s minimalism and 
circumvention of the superfluous) presents perhaps the greatest means of 
signifying the transcendent.  As a whole, then, Hal Hartley's film aptly displays 
this kind of cinematic sparseness, and in doing so exemplifies the transcendental 
and essential qualities of his characters and story, without sacrificing a 
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significant emphasis on the embodied, existential attributes of encountering a 
world filled with monsters, saints, and the miraculous. 
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